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Introduction
It is well-known that following an exchange rate depreciation exports tend to expand gradually. This gradual export growth is often attributed to non-exporters being slow to start exporting and existing exporters being slow to expand the products, markets, or customers to which they sell. It is also sometimes suggested that the weak export response arises because devaluations occur in periods of financial distress that make financing export expansion difficult. This gradual export expansion is thought to affect the dynamics of net exports and potentially output (Baldwin and Krugman, 89, Roberts & Tybout, 97) . Here, we reconsider empirically and theoretically the source of sluggish export growth. We document the salient micro and macroeconomic features of export dynamics in large devaluations. We then develop a small open economy model in which exports are determined in part by the entry decisions of non-exporters and exit decisions of exporters. We then show the model can capture the observed sluggish growth of exports following a devaluation and that these export dynamics lead net exports to shift more gradually from deficit to surplus. We find that these sluggish export dynamics lead to a sharper contraction in output but shallower depreciations associated with these devaluation episodes. Additionally the surge in intangible investment in exporting capacity makes measured labor productivity fall substantially.
We begin by characterizing the salient features of exports around large devaluations in 11 emerging markets. We focus on these periods of economic turmoil as these are large, easily identified events.
1 First, we confirm that there is a gradual expansion of exports following a devaluation. The elasticity of exports to the real exchange rate is initially low and rises over time, peaking in the third year following the devaluation. 2 Second, we find a role for interest rates in dampening export growth. Specifically, we find that in countries with higher interest rates, measured by J.P. Morgan's EMBI spreads, the elasticity of exports to the real exchange rate is even more sluggish. These two features hold when studying all exports as well as exports to the U.S.. Next, we examine the role of the extensive margin
in export dynamics. We analyze the extensive margin using both product-level data for all the countries' exports to the U.S. and custom trade data for Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay.
Using these disaggregate data, we find that the extensive margin of trade (measured as number of products, destinations, and exporters) is important in explaining the sluggishness of exports, and that the level of aggregation is important in measuring the role of the extensive margin in export growth.
These features of export dynamics pose a challenge for standard static trade models such as the Armington, Eaton-Kortum, or Melitz 3 models. In these models exports move proportionally to relative 1 More generally, it is well known that trade tends to respond with a lag to real exchange fluctuations.
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The export elasticity is measured as the change in exports divided by the change in the real exchange rate where the changes have been calculated relative to their pre-devaluation levels. In a standard Armington model, this object is constant. It is a convenient way to compare the export response in countries with different size devaluations.
prices and there is no direct effect of interest rates on exports. 4 We thus develop a small open economy model that can capture these gradual export dynamics and has a role for interest rates on exports. We embed a parsimonious model of producers starting and stopping to export into a small open economy that borrows to smooth consumption in response to aggregate shocks to the interest rate, productivity, and the discount factor (impatience). In our model, the amount a country can export depends on the stock of exporters currently actively selling overseas as well as the terms of trade.
Over time the stock of exporters can change as a result of investments by non-exporters to access foreign markets and by existing exporters to maintain their presence in foreign markets. Specifically, we follow the literature on export decisions (see Baldwin and Krugman (89) , Dixit (89a, b) , Roberts and Tybout (97), Das, Roberts and Tybout (07) , and Alessandria and Choi (07)) and model the producer-level decision to export as involving both an up-front, or sunk cost, and ongoing cost. We allow for idiosyncratic shocks to the cost of exporting. Thus, non-exporters will start exporting when the value of exporting exceeds the cost of starting to export. Similarly, exporters will continue to export as long as the value of exporting exceeds the cost of continuing to export. As long as the up-front cost exceeds the continuation cost, the stock of exporters is a durable asset that will adjust gradually to a shock. It also implies that exports are a return on the foregone resources to build up the stock of exporters. Fluctuations in the interest rate and discount factor thus will potentially affect the incentive to export by altering how the future benefits of exporting are discounted.
Our GE model allows us to identify the shocks that generate economic periods associated with devaluations and evaluate the role of trade barriers on export, net export, and output dynamics. We find devaluations, and the associated economic crisis, to be the result of a combination of increased international borrowing costs, falling observed productivity, and less impatience. In response to these shocks, a country would like to expand its exports by increasing the number of producers that export.
However, the sunk aspect of export costs implies that the costs of expanding the stock of exporters are front-loaded while the benefits, measured as future export profits, are back-loaded. Thus, to expand the stock of exporters requires the economy to devote substantial resources to invest in export capacity rather than produce goods for the export market. This intangible investment in export capacity tends to reduce a country's physical output initially and its ability to run a trade surplus and therefore its indebtedness. Given that the periods we study are characterized by both high interest rates and more patient consumers, countries have little incentive to invest in expanding exports too quickly or strongly. Compared to a model without this sunk export cost, this dampens export growth and leads to more gradual, hump shaped net export dynamics.
Our paper is related to a number of distinct strands in the literature on international trade and macroeconomics. First, there is a literature that focuses on understanding why trade responds differently to changes in exchange rates or trade costs at different horizons. For instance, Baldwin and Krugman (1989) , Dixit (89a), Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) 4
In these models interest rates can affect trade through general equilibrium factors. In particular, a rise in world interest rates encourages savings which can stimulate exports. This makes the finding of a negative relationship between interest rates and exports even more puzzling.
develop partial equilibrium models of sunk costs and real exchange rate fluctuations. Unlike these models, we develop a GE model which forces us to take a stand on the aggregate shocks but allows us to evaluate the effect of these trade barriers on aggregate fluctuations in output and net exports.
Ruhl (07) and Alessandria and Choi (2011a,b) also develop general equilibrium models of sunk export costs but focus on the dynamics of trade growth in response to changes in trade barriers. In terms of business cycles, Alessandria and Choi (2007) develop a two country GE model with sunk costs and find a minor impact on the dynamics of net exports in response to productivity shocks compared to a model without sunk costs. The larger effects in our paper arise because we consider a different set of shocks (interest rates and impatience) and much larger shocks. Indeed, when we constrain ourselves to just considering productivity shocks, we find a relatively small impact of the sunk costs. Additionally, we explicitly consider the aggregate consequences in a particular calibration that generates export sluggishness whereas the earlier Alessandria-Choi model did not generate much sluggishness. Drozd and Nosal (2012) and Engel and Wang (2011) also develop two-country GE models in which trade expands sluggishly over the business cycle. Unlike these models, we measure the sluggishness of exports and evaluate the impact of the model in explaining gross and net trade flows. Second, our focus on emerging market business cycles is related to papers by Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) . Unlike these papers, we explicitly model gross trade flows and consider their impact on output, net exports, and relative prices. A key feature of our model with relative prices fluctuations is that interest rates are now quite countercyclical as the increases in interest rates generate depreciations that reduce the incentive to produce and consume. Generating countercyclical interest rates is a challenge in standard models, while here the recessionary impact of interest rates is quite strong.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section documents the dynamics of exports, exchange rates, and interest rates in some emerging markets using aggregate and disaggregate data. Section 3 develops our benchmark model and presents the model calibration. In Section 4 we examine the model's predictions for export dynamics. We conduct a sensitivity analysis in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Data
In this section we document key relationships between exports, the real exchange rate, and interest rates in a sample of small open economies that have experienced a large real exchange rate depreciation in the past two decades. We emphasize four salient features of the data. First, the elasticity of exports to the real exchange rate, 5 measured as the change in exports relative to the change in the real exchange rate from prior to the devaluation, is quite low initially and rises over time.
Second, high interest rates suppress exports as our export elasticity measure is more sluggish for countries that faced larger increases in international borrowing costs. Third, an important component 5 We focus on this measure of trade flows since it allows us to compare the export response of devaluations of different sizes and standard theories (Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, 1994 ) predict a fairly tight relationship between this variable and the Armington elasticity.
of the weak export response is a weak response in the extensive margin of trade, where the extensive margin is measured in various ways including by products, product-destinations, and firms. To establish these features we move from an aggregate to disaggregate level. Table 1 lists the eleven countries we consider along with crises dates. As mentioned above, the choice of the sample is dictated by two considerations: the countries are small open economies which experienced a recent real exchange rate depreciation, and data is available for at least 24 quarters after the event. The data appendix provides further details on the data sources and construction of all series. Figure 1 shows the evolution of average exchange rates, interest rates and exports in a 40 quarter window around the large devaluations in these 11 emerging market economies. All data has been deseasonalized. Exchange rates and exports are relative to their levels on the eve of devaluation. The large devaluations are characterized by big real exchange rate depreciations, measured using the producer prices relative to the US producer prices. Moreover, these countries also experienced a spike in interest rates, measured as a JP Morgan EMBI spread. On average the real exchange rate increases by about 40 log points initially and the interest rate spread rises about 1800 basis points.
Macro Data
These increases exhibit some mean reversion but are at high levels 8 quarters after the devaluation.
In contrast, the response of exports, measured in dollars, is muted. For more than four quarters, exports barely change from their pre-crisis level and only increase gradually, when real exchange rates begin to appreciate again. These export and relative price dynamics suggest there is a relatively low elasticity of exports initially and that export elasticity increases with time.
The large spike in international borrowing costs suggests that the increase in interest rates is one possible explanation for the slow growth of exports. To explore how the interest rate influences export growth, we split the 11 emerging economies into two groups based on the cumulative increase in their interest rates 12 quarters following the crisis date. 6 The high interest rate countries are Argentina, Korea, Malaysia, Russia, and Thailand. The low interest rate countries are Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey, and Uruguay. Figure 2a and 2b show the average interest rate, exports, real exchange rate, and export elasticity to the real exchange rate in the two groups. Figure 2a presents export growth and real exchange depreciation relative to the level of these variables in the crisis date. The implied trade elasticity is defined as the ratio of export growth to the real exchange rate depreciation. In Figure 2b , we detrend exports and the real exchange rate using a H-P filter and compute the trade elasticity using the detrended variables. These figures show that on average, the high interest rate countries experienced 6 Specifically, for each country we computed a weighted average of the interest rate over the first twelve quarters. Our weighting scheme weighted earlier periods by more than later periods. Our decomposition into high and low interest rate countries is fairly robust to our weighting scheme, interval considered (i.e. the period the average was computed over), or measure studied (within country spreads or EMBI spreads).
a more than 2500 basis point increase in their interest rates, compared with a 1000 basis point increase for the low interest rate countries. At the same time, the real exchange rate depreciation for the high interest rate countries is bigger and more persistent. However, the export growth for the high interest rate countries is lower in the 24 quarters following the devaluations; the average difference is more than 10%. The export elasticity to the real exchange rate is substantially below the level for the low interest rate countries. Even after we take out the trend in exports, the export elasticity is low for the high interest rate countries and high for the low interest rate countries. For both groups, the trade elasticity increases with time. The short run elasticity is low, and the long run elasticity is much higher.
Micro-Evidence on Export Dynamics
In this section we use disaggregated data to study some features of export dynamics following devaluation. First, we study the movements in the volume and variety of manufactured goods exported to the US. We study exports to the US because we have high-frequency disaggregated data for this market for all countries. Also, the US is typically the largest trading partner for these countries and thus exports to the US are likely to be somewhat representative of overall exports. We note three main features: First, the volume of exports grows gradually. Second, the extensive margin grows gradually. We analyze the extensive margin with custom trade data for Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay. The custom trade data for Argentina is at product and destination level. The custom trade data for the other three countries is at firm, product, and destination level. Using this extensive dataset, we examine the importance of extensive margin in driving export dynamics in these four countries. The custom-level data shows that the US data tend to understate the role of the extensive margin in export growth. Lastly, we examine the dynamics of export prices using the U.S. data and find that export prices tend to fall substantially less than the real exchange rate.
Quantities of Exports to US
To get a sense of what drives the gradual response in exports we consider more micro-oriented data on how the number of products and destinations changes following a devaluation. We undertake this analysis using highly disaggregated monthly US data on imports (from the Census). An advantage of using this data is that we can also eliminate any concerns arising from the previous country-level analysis that the gradual increase in exports reflects a gradual increase in global economic activity or a change in the industry composition of exports. Specifically, to control for changes in the economic environment we consider how a devaluing country's exports to the US gain market share in US imports.
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We begin by constructing a trade-weighted measure of each country's market share. That is, we define country i's share of US imports as:
This does not fully capture the potential changes in exports, since changes in relative prices could also lead to a change in the share of imports in US expenditures. However, this effect is likely to be small since devaluing countries are likely to have a relatively small impact on the relative price of imports to domestic expenditures. To study the source of export growth, we construct a measure of the change in the extensive margin.
We measure the extensive margin as a count of the distinct number of HS-10 codes shipped to different US customs districts. This is the finest level of disaggregation in publicly available trade data.
8 Thus we define the extensive margin,
To account for the growth in trade we measure this as a share, # it s where:
Since we are looking at how a country's share of US imports changes, we construct a measure of the real exchange rate purged of changes in the bilateral real exchange rate with the U.S.. Figures 3A and 3B summarize the average dynamics of each of these variables for our panel of 11 countries. The individual country dynamics are plotted in the appendix. To smooth out some of the variation in the data, we present statistics in six month intervals.
9 Figure 3A shows how our share measures vary over time. Figure 3B shows our measures vary when we remove a log-linear trend.
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We examine a more precise measure of extensive marging using the custom data for Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay in the subsequent subsection. The first panel in each figure shows the dynamics of a trade weighted real exchange rate for each country. Real exchange rates are measured using producer prices and consumer prices. Producer price based real exchange rate fluctuations are slightly smaller than consumption based ones. In general, the real exchange rate depreciates about 30 to 40 percent over the first year. Over the subsequent 3 years the real exchange rate appreciates slightly, thus changes in relative prices are quite persistent. The second panel shows how our measure of the volume of exports evolves. The third panel shows how the extensive margin evolves. The last panel shows how exports evolve with relative prices using a measure of the ratio of mean change in exports to the mean change in the real exchange rate. The elasticity of the export share is close to zero initially and rises to about 50 percent over 36 months. Whether this is persistent beyond three years depends on our detrending method.
The elasticity of the extensive margin is considerably larger. Depending on our de-trending it is 1/3 to twice as much over the first three years. In short, the evidence from the US is consistent with our finding using aggregate data of a weak, gradual export response following a devaluation. The US data points to the extensive margin being important in explaining export dynamics.
Lastly, we examine the dynamics of exports and the extensive margin of exports from the high and low interest rate countries to the U.S. respectively. Figure 4 shows that the high interest rate countries experience a bigger exchange rate devaluation in the first year. Similar to what the aggregate export data suggests, the high interest rate countries experience slower export growth. The biggest gap in export growth between the high and low interest rate countries is observed four years after the devaluation. In terms of the extensive margin, the difference between the high and low interest rate countries is smaller. 10 The trade elasticities are also bigger for low interest rate countries than for high interest rate countries.
Our analysis provides some sense of the contribution of the extensive margin in export growth following devaluations. However, one might suspect that movements in our measure of the extensive margin might not contribute much to export growth. To adjust for this possibility, we now examine the importance of the extensive margin in driving export growth. Following Eaton et al (2007), we disaggregate the intensive margin from the exporters' margins of entry and exit as follows: Because we are interested in the dynamics of the intensive and extensive margins following devaluations, we decompose the cumulative growth of exports relative to the period of devaluations. Therefore, the intensive and extensive margins are the cumulative margins following devaluations. An alternative decomposition is to define continuers, entrants, and exiters period by period and calculate the intensive and extensive margin, as in Eaton et al (2007) . Figure 5 shows the decomposition of cumulative export growth for the high and low interest rate countries in our sample. The black solid lines are for percentage change in exports. Consistent with Figure 4 , high interest rate countries experience smaller export growth. For both groups, the intensive margin plays a bigger role in contributing to export growth than the extensive margin due to entry and exit. However, the cumulative effect of the extensive margin is not negligible, especially for the low interest rate countries as shown by the blue dashed lines in the lower panel. The finding that the extensive margin is more important for the low interest rate countries suggests that interest rate movements depress export growth and a potential channel is the extensive margin due to the entry and exit.
Customs Data for Four Countries
One might still suspect that our measure of the extensive margin understates that importance of the extensive margin since product-level data may hide changes in the number of firms or producers exporting. We can get a sense of the bias by looking at transaction level data. Our detailed trade data are the customs data on import and export shipments. The data vary somewhat in coverage over time, but give detailed information for each trade shipment, generally including the name of the importer or exporter, the date of declaration, the source or destination country, the quantity, weight, price, and value of the good, along with detailed information at disaggregation levels as the 6-digit HTS classification for Mexico, or 10-digit for Colombia and Uruguay, or 11-digit HTS classification for Argentina. We obtained most of our data from Penta-Transaction, a private provider of trade statistics that receives the shipment data from the customs authorities. We restrict our data to manufactured goods. Figure 6 shows the breakdown of the aggregate movement in trade to all destination using two measures of the extensive margin for each of the four countries. For each country, we decompose the extensive margin (using the Eaton method) at the most disaggregate product-destination level we have. For Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay we then measure the contribution of the extensive margin by the firm-product-destination level. For Argentina, since we lack firm-level data we go from 6-digit to 10-digit data. Not surprisingly, all of the data show a stronger extensive margin response at the more disaggregate level. For Mexico, studying firms at the six digit level nearly triples the contribution of the extensive margin response. For Colombia and Uruguay the increase in the contribution is a bit smaller but still quite large. For Argentina, going to a lower level of aggregation nearly doubles the role of the extensive margin. Thus, it appears the extensive margin is an important driver of the export response following devaluations.
Model
We develop a small open economy model with endogenous entry and exit from exporting to study exports and export participation over the business cycle. We assume a unit mass of imperfectly substitutable goods are produced in the small open economy. These goods differ in the costs they require to be shipped overseas so that only a subset of products are exported. The economy faces shocks to the interest rate, , w R productivity, , z and discount factor, β . The productivity and interest rate shocks are standard while the discount factor shocks are commonly employed in a broad range of DSGE studies (). 11 These shocks lead to endogenous fluctuations in output and the real exchange 11 An increase in β will generate something like a sudden stop in that it will lead to a large increase in the current account and a large depreciation. In this respect it is not unlike a shock that tightens a borrowing constraint (Mendoza, 2011 Given these costs, it is well known that there will be a threshold for non-exporters to start to export 0 κ and a threshold for exporters to continue exporting,
κ These thresholds will then determine the fraction of non-exporters who start exporting Consumers consume a composite non-traded good made by combining domestic goods and foreign goods imported from abroad. Imports, M are exchanged using the revenue from exporting and the net financing from international borrowing and lending. The borrowing and lending is via one-period discount bonds, as in standard small open economy RBC models. The asset position is denoted by 12 We focus on thses shocks rather than shocks to foreign demand or the exogenous price of exports since those shocks will reduce exports.
B . The bonds are assumed to be denominated in foreign goods. To keep the model stationary we allow for the country to pay a premium above the world rate that is increasing in its debt. 14 We consider the problem of consumers, final good aggregators, and then exporters. We then sketch out the equilibrium conditions.
Consumer's Problem
Consumers start the period with a stock of debt, B . They receive labor income, wl , and profits from owning exporting firms, Π . They are subject to shocks to how they discount future utility (i.e. β changes over time). They choose how much to consume of a final good and how much to borrow at a rate, R. The Bellman equation is:
The first order conditions are:
Final Good Market
The final consumption good is produced by a competitive final good sector that purchases domestic and foreign inputs and then sells them at price P. The aggregator's problem is: 
EX is a demand shifter that depends on the state of the economy. We assume that production for home and abroad is segmented with production for export subject to diminishing returns
We first consider the export decision taking the intratemporal pricing decision as given and then study the pricing decision.
Export Decision
The Bellman equation of a producer with export status { } 0,1 ∈ m and fixed export cost κ in aggregate state, S , is:
where ( ) S π denotes the profits from exporting, and the cost of exporting depends on the cost draw κ and the price of exporting. (The idea here is that you have to hire κ workers and that productivity shocks equally affect the efficiency of producing goods and exporting services). The stochastic discount factor is ( ).
' S q
This problem implies that only producers with low fixed costs of exporting will export. The export cost of the marginal exporter equals the difference in the expected value of a potential exporter from being an exporter or a non-exporter:
Because entry shocks are iid, the gain in export value is independent of the current export status and therefore the threshold for starting and continuing is identical ( * κ κ κ = = 1 0 ). Integrating over the distribution of entry costs, we can define the expected values of starting as a non-exporter and an exporter as:
Defining the difference in the expected value of exporting as:
yields a straightforward relationship between the current gain in the value of exporting and future profits, export costs, and the future gain from exporting: The marginal entry cost is equal to the discounted expected profits from exporting plus the savings in future costs of exporting.
Pricing Decision
Now consider the determination of inputs. The firm faces a downward sloping demand curve 
The optimal price is a markup over marginal cost: 
Export Supply Function
We assume that, given a price of exports 
Equilibrium
We first describe the steady state equilibrium. We will calibrate and solve the model dynamics numerically in the subsequent subsection. To simplify the calculation, we assume the following 15 The appendix presents the details of the problem that the rest of the world solves, where the demand for exports from the SOE is the export supply function in our model. functional forms for the preference and technology. We assume that ( )
, where ω is the Armington weight on the imported goods, and γ is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. 16 Next, we assume consumers have
, where σ is the risk aversion coefficient, η governs the labor supply elasticity, and λ is a scale parameter for the aggregate labor supply. GHH preferences are widely used to study the business cycles for small open economies as it eliminates the wealth effect from the labor supply. 
Given the curvature in the production of exported goods, it is useful to define the real exchange rate as the relative price of domestic consumed to imported goods or:
We also define real output as:
where bars denotes steady state prices. Finally, we measure net exports scaled by gross trade flows:
Calibration
This subsection describes how we set the parameters in the model. Some parameters are based on standard values. Some parameters are chosen so that the steady state equilibrium can match certain empirical moments. Finally, some other parameters are chosen to match the observed sluggish export dynamics.
First, we set the time discount factor β , the risk aversion σ , and labor supply parameter η to the standard values. The elasticity of labor supply parameter η is taken from Mendoza (1991) . The weight on labor in the utility function, , λ is chosen so labor is one third of the time endowment. The interest elasticity parameter is chosen to make the model stationary.
We assume the distribution of entry and continuation costs have an exponential structure: The elasticity of substitution, γ , curvature in production, α and elasticity of substitution, , θ will determine the dynamics of the volume and variety of exports. Since part of our goal is to evaluate the contribution of this sluggishness on aggregate outcomes, we choose parameters so that the model can come close to match these export dynamics. We choose the curvature in the production function, , α so that the export price relative to the non-traded locally produced goods price (i.e. P ( ) so that the model can match the observed typical dynamics of industrial production, the EMBI rate, and the real exchange rate in our 11 devaluation episodes. Given we also target the extensive margin elasticity this essentially involves try to fit the model to 4 aggregate series.
Given the pre-set parameters, we calibrate the remaining parameters to match the target statistics in the steady state as shown in Table 3 .
In particular, for the average debt level in the steady state, we can set it so that b M B = / (debt equal to b times quarterly imports). With imports of 15 percent of GDP this is equivalent to 37.5 percent of GDP.
To explore the importance of getting export dynamics right on aggregate outcomes we also consider a model with no sunk costs. In this model
. We choose the size of fixed costs so 25 percent of producers export. Because the entry and continuation costs are the same this implies there is much too much churning in export status that only 25 percent of exporters continue and that 25 percent of non-exporters start exporting each period. We choose the distribution of fixed costs to generate the same average elasticity of exports to the real exchange rate given the shocks we have backed out of the sunk cost model.
Disciplining the Export Elasticity
As we discussed the dynamics of the export elasticity are primarily determined by three parameters, ( ).
, , θ γ α
It is straightforward to derive the relationship between these parameters and the elasticity of exports to the real exchange rate from the pricing equation and export supply equations taking movements in the wages and productivity as given. To begin with, the change in exports per firm depends on the change in exporters and the relative prices:
where the change in the export price just depends on the change in marginal cost, which depends on the change in exports. Substituting out the change in exports yields a formula for the change in the producer's price: γ This is intuitive since a higher α means less curvature in production while a higher γ means a bigger export response. This effect gets unwound a bit as more producers enter and they take market share from the original exporters. Using this approximation and then solving for aggregate nominal exports yields the export elasticity: 
4.
Results Figure 7 plots the properties of our model, the data, and the model with no sunk cost for a set of shocks that closely match the dynamics of output, interest rates, and the real exchange rate in our benchmark sunk cost model. The first three panels plot our target series. Overall, the fit of the sunk cost model is quite good. The largest gap between the model and the data is in the real exchange rate over the first 6 quarters. In the data the real exchange rate overshoots its longer run level by about 10 percentage points while the sunk cost model generates a fairly smooth transition to the long run level.
The fourth panel depicts the elasticity of the extensive margin. We have chosen this to match the average extensive margin elasticity from the data. Figure 8 depicts the productivity, interest rate, and discount factor shocks we infer from the model.
Perhaps surprisingly these episodes are characterized by increases in productivity. Note that this measure of productivity does not correspond to the measure from the national accounts since it does not account for the resources that are being used to build up the stock of exporters. Measured labor productivity (Y/L), which includes the labor used in export costs, actually falls initially over the first three quarters and then rises strongly to the level of the shock from period 4 onwards. By period 10 measured productivity is roughly equal to TFP. The large gap between TFP and labor productivity arises because substantial resources are directed towards the intangible investment involved in preparing products for the export market. The discount factor increases initially making agents more patient so that the consumers discount the future less. In DSGE papers this is often interpreted as shocks to the financial sector. While the interest rate shock appears to be stationary we find that the productivity and discount factor shocks remain far from their initial levels 11 quarters on. This is necessary to generate the increase in output and exports along with the persistent depreciation of the real exchange rate.
Returning to the properties of the model, the fifth panel depicts the export elasticity, measured as the ratio of the change in exports to the change in the real exchange rate. Over the window we focus on, the average response in the model is slightly larger than in the data (0.36 vs 0.33). Because of the dynamics of the extensive margin the model generates some, but not all, of the gradual expansion of the export elasticity. In the model the export elasticity rises from 25 percent to 50 percent, while in the data the increase is from about 5 percent to 50 percent. The final panel depicts net exports (scaled by gross trade flows). Here we see that the model generates slightly stronger movement than in the data.
Specifically the data show a sizeable increase in net exports of about 25 percent of gross trade flows while the model generates a stronger increase of almost 35 percent. As in the data, in the model it takes about a year to get the maximum response of net exports. The larger long-run response primarily reflects the larger export elasticity from our experiment.
To evaluate the role of sluggish export dynamics on the aggregate economy we consider the aggregate response to the same shocks in the no sunk cost model. The dispersion in the fixed export costs in this no sunk model has been calibrated to generate the same average export elasticity as in the data. Because there is no sunk cost the only gradualness in export growth comes from the one period lag delaying entry. Indeed, when we consider the elasticity of the extensive margin, we see that there is a sharp increase in exporters in the first period and that the average response is a bit smaller.
There is some sluggishness in the exporter elasticity because the shocks lead to a series of surprises over the first four quarters. Because of these dynamics of the extensive margin, the export elasticity grows very little after the first period and is decreasing after four quarters. Compared to the sunk cost model, exports expand more initially and less later on. As a result of these different export dynamics, output falls much less initially and much more in the long run. The weaker initial drop in output in the no sunk cost model arises because fewer resources are used up to generate the initial increase in exports than in the sunk cost model. In the long-run, output is substantially lower as more resources are used to sustain exports (i.e. cover the fixed costs of exporting). The real exchange rate depreciates by slightly more than in our benchmark model and there is a slightly larger net exports reversal of close to 40 percent compared to 35 percent in the sunk cost model. Because the sunk cost model comes closer to matching export and net export dynamics it is clear that it must do a significantly better job of explaining the dynamics of imports.
To provide a better sense of how the sluggish export dynamics affects the aggregates we plot impulse responses to each of the shocks in the sunk and no-sunk cost models in Figure 9 . The columns presents the response to productivity, interest rate and discount factor shocks respectively. In response to a persistent positive productivity shocks, the sunk cost model generates a smaller initial increase in output and a larger increase after three quarters. The real exchange rate depreciates slightly less initially and slightly more in the long-run in the sunk cost model while the net export response is considerably stronger with no sunk cost as the barriers to repaying are quite different
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. In response to the interest rate shock, we find very different export dynamics across the two models.
With the sunk cost, exports actually fall while with the no cost model exports expand. In terms of net exports, there is a stronger response in the no sunk cost model. The different export dynamics ultimately lead to a slightly stronger contractionary effect of interest rates with the sunk cost model. It is useful to note that interest rate shocks are quite contractionary in this framework as a 1 percentage point increase in the interest rate reduces output by almost 5 percentage points. The differing export response arises because high interest rates make it costly to invest in becoming an exporter. In response to shocks to the discount factor shock so that agents become more patient we see that the country would like to shift consumption to the future and thus net exports increase. Output falls as the country cuts back on consumption and the real exchange rate depreciates.
Finally, we explore the effect of interest rates on exports and the economy. Specifically, we consider a high and low interest rate calibration. Figure 10 plots the interest rate, real exchange rate, export elastictiy and extensive margin elasticity paths for these two alternative models. We see that the higher interest rate path implies a larger real exchange rate depreciation but a lower export and 17
These differences are much larger if one normalizes net exports by steady state trade since trade is much higher in the no sunk cost model. extensive margin elasticity. Quantitatively, depending on the horizon we consider the export elasticity is between 80 to 100 percent as large for the high interest rate economy. The similarity arises because the intensive margin response (or short-run response) is essentially identical across the models. If we focus on the difference between the export response at longer horizons and the short run horizon (i.e. on impact), then we see that the high interest rate economy generates between 0 and 30 percent of the growth in the export elasticity of the low interest rate economy. Thus, the model is clearly capable of delivering some of the observed differences in the export response across our different country groupings.
Sensitivity
A key focus of our paper has been on relative price fluctutaions. These relative price movements are primarily determined by the Armington elasticity and the elasticity of substitution. This brings the model closer to the typical one good model explored by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) .
Because it is close to a one-good model relative prices are much more stable in response to all the shocks while net exports respond more. Specifically, in response to the productivity shock, output and net exports increase by more. In response to an interest rate shock we see that output now goes up whereas previously it fell. The gap is quite substantial as a 100 basis point increase in the interest rate in the high Armington elasticity case increases output by 0.25 percent while it reduces output by close to 3 percent. There are similar differences in the output response to an increase in patience. The contractionary effect of interest rate and discount factor shocks when goods are imperfect substitutes is related to the depreciations induced by the desire to run trade surpluses. The reduction in the price of domestic goods increase the cost of consumption (which is a combination of domestic and imported goods) relative to the return to labor reducing the incentive to consume and work.
Conclusions
We study empirically and theoretically export dynamics following a devaluation in a number of emerging markets. We document two key features of exports. First, exports grow gradually with the elasticity rising from 0 to nearly 50 percent over 3 years. This export growth reflects a gradual expansion in the extensive margin of trade with the elasticity of product-destinations growing by about twice that of export volume. Second, we find evidence that high interest rates tend to depress exports.
These export dynamics are a challenge for standard trade models. We embed a dynamic model of exporting subject to sunk costs into an otherwise standard SOE model.
As is well known, with these sunk costs, the stock of exporters is a state variable of the economy and expanding this stock requires an intangible investment. In response to shocks similar to those experienced by devaluing countries, exports and exporters grow gradually. We find the model can capture the very low initial response of exports and exporters following a devaluation as well as the average response over the first six years following a devaluation. We also find that the model can generate an important role for interest rates in depressing exports. Similar to the data, we find a smaller elasticity of exports to the real exchange rate when interest rate increases are larger.
By contrasting our model with one in which there is no sluggish export response we find a potentially important macroeconomic role for this sluggishness. The sluggishness in the export response implies emerging market recessions are deeper while depreciations are actually milder. Without the gradual export expansion, the trade balance reversal would be larger initially so that international indebtedness would rise by less.
Our findings about the dynamics of trade around devaluations is useful to the recent debate about monetary policy in the Euro. Much discussion of the recent Euro crisis has centered around the loss of monetary policy independence by stagnating economies on the periphery with some arguing that the inability of periphery countries to devalue has contributed to their stagnation. The common view is that a devaluation would boost GDP by leading to substantial expenditure switching at home and abroad.
Here we find that the physical barriers to trade mitigate some of the stimulatory effects of devaluations. The key challenge is then to identify the terms of trade separate from productivity shock or shock to wages.
• Note: We convert the U.S. Imports of Merchandise into real terms using the U.S. Import Price Index and normalize them using the U. • Among other things, this dataset breaks U.S. import values down by HS10 commodity, country of origin, and district of entry.
• We calculate the extensive margin as the number of distinct HS10 commodity-country-district pairs imported having strictly positive volume.
RESTRICTED REAL EXCHANGE RATES CALCULATION
• For any country x, let qx be the trade-weighted real exchange weight of country x, measured in log changes.
• For any countries x and y, let y x, α be the trade weight, measuring the fraction of x's trade that is with y.
• For any countries/parts of the world x and y, let qx,y be the real exchange rate between x and y, measured in log changes.
• Now, let x be the country whose RER we are looking to restrict, and let ROW be the world, excluding x, the U.S., and China. Then we calculated the restricted real exchange rate as:
